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With the Trans-Pacific Partnership on the brink of 
collapse, many now view the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a potential 
replacement. However, RCEP offers a radically different 
model for trade multilateralism. It promises a lower level 
of reform ambition, and offers a membership model 
in which China is the leader and lynchpin of Asian 
regionalism. As RCEP moves to completion in 2017, 
it may usher in an historic shift from an Asia-Pacific to 
Indo-Pacific regional economic order.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• With President-Elect Trump promising to withdraw the U.S. 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), many have begun 
to view the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) agreement as a potential replacement.
• These mega-regional Free Trade Agreements are 
an attempt to induce systemic change in the Asia-
Pacific trade system, by moving from a bilateral to 
multilateral architecture.
• However, the TPP and RCEP offer competing models 
for trade multilateralism. They are differentiated by their 
level of reform ambition, approach to membership, and 
leadership dynamics.
• RCEP promises a lower level of trade liberalisation 
than the TPP, which is more appealing to developing-
country members. It also embodies an approach where 
China, rather than the U.S., is the lynchpin of regional 
economic integration.
• If RCEP emerges as the new template for trade liberalisation, 
it will contribute to a transition from an Asia-Pacific to Indo-
Pacific model for the regional economic order.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2016 U.S. Presidential election cast a major 
shadow over the trade architecture of the 
Asia-Pacific. Trade policy emerged as a critical 
issue during a campaign characterised by an 
unprecedented level of populist attacks upon 
the merits of free trade. The recently completed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement was 
singled out for critique, with both presidential 
candidates labelling the deal as harmful to 
U.S. economic interests. President-Elect Trump 
has since promised to initiate a U.S. withdrawal 
from the TPP on his first day in office, terminally 
compromising the agreement in its current 
form. As the TPP was the most significant trade 
agreement to be negotiated in the Asia-Pacific 
for many decades, its coming collapse poses 
hard questions for ongoing efforts to reform the 
regional trading system.
However, the TPP is not the only game in town 
for regional trade policy. It had developed 
alongside another ‘mega-regional’ trade 
agreement: the ASEAN-led Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). 
The TPP and RCEP proposals share several 
common policy goals, including a desire to kick-
start liberalisation efforts in the region, and do so 
on a multilateral rather than bilateral basis.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Scope and 
coverage
WTO-Plus approach: Market access 
commitments alongside 24 additional 
trade-related measures
WTO-consistent approach: Focus on 
trade liberalisation and investment 
facilitation
Member states
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, 
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
United States, Vietnam
ASEAN bloc, 




Open to all APEC parties; includes 
accession mechanism
Only open to current ASEAN FTA partners 
during negotiation phase
Total GDP of 
members
USD 27.4 trillion 
(36.6% of global economy)
USD 22.7 trillion 
(30.4% of global economy)
Total two-way trade 
of members
USD 8.7 trillion 
(26.2% of world trade)
USD 9.5 trillion 
(28.8% of world trade)
Intra-regional trade 
of members
USD 3.7 trillion 
(43.2% members’ total trade)
USD 4.3 trillion 
(44.6% members’ total trade)
Source: Author’s summary and calculations, from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership Chapter Summaries 
(http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/summaries/Pages/summaries.aspx), RCEP Parties, Guiding Principles and Objectives for 
Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-
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But they are also characterised by several 
differences, including their level of reform 
ambition, their approach to membership, and 
the question of regional leadership. With the 
TPP now seemingly dead, some analysts have 
suggested that RCEP may come to replace the 
TPP as the vehicle for trade multilateralism in 
the Asia-Pacific.
Importantly, RCEP offers a radically different 
vision for how the regional trade should evolve. 
Where the TPP offered an Asia-Pacific model 
based on the principle of ‘open regionalism’, 
RCEP instead adopts a closed approach to 
membership arrangements that are more 
Indo-Pacific in form. Its approach to 
liberalisation is significantly lower, prioritising 
tariff reductions rather than the development 
of new trade law in areas such as investment, 
environment and services. RCEP is also a 
decidedly China-led process, and potentially 
heralds an era in which China emerges as a 
meaningful counterweight to U.S. economic 
leadership in the region. Policymakers need to 
carefully weigh the benefits and costs of the 
RCEP model as negotiations move towards 
completion in 2017.
THE FRAGMENTED TRADE 
ARCHITECTURE OF THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC
In recent years, the structure of the Asia-Pacific 
trade system has been rapidly transformed. 
Regional economies have for many years 
been very open to trade, with the East Asian 
economic miracle of the post-war period driven 
by the export powerhouses of Japan, Korea, 
the Asian tigers and more recently China. For 
most of this period, governments had been 
committed to multilateralism when it came 
to trade policy. Liberalisation was primarily 
advanced as part of global-level trade reforms, 
negotiated and enforced through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World 
Trade Organisation. Regional trade initiatives 
were also multilateral in style, such as APEC’s 
‘open regionalism’ approach to liberalisation, 
and the landmark Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTA of 1992. 
However, during the 2000s Asia-Pacific 
governments began to gradually change their 
trade policy strategies. Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) – which preferentially lower 
trade barriers between only two countries 
– increasingly came into favour. In the year 
2000, the Asia-Pacific1 was home to only four 
bilateral FTAs. But as exploratory moves turned 
into a rush, the number of bilateral FTAs grew 
rapidly. By the end of 2015, fifty-two bilateral 
FTAs had been negotiated between Asia-Pacific 
governments, and a further fifty-four were 
signed with parties outside the region (Table 1). 
These agreements dramatically overhauled 
the architecture of the regional trade system, 
from one based on multilateralism to one 
characterised by the dominance of bilateral 
agreement-making.
The proliferation of bilateral FTAs has led 
to what trade economists call the ‘noodle 
bowl problem’2. Rather than having a single 
integrated system, the Asia-Pacific is now 
fragmented and criss-crossed by many 
bilateral deals. Compounding matters, 
these FTAs vary widely in their content. Each 
includes (and excludes) different sectors, 
and imposes different commitments in terms 
of tariff reduction. They also vary in terms of 
regulatory provisions, with each implementing 
investment protection, intellectual property, 
and e-commerce rules differently. The result is a 
patchwork of overlapping and incommensurate 
FTAs, which metaphorically resembles a tangled 
bowl of noodles. Rather than having a single set 
of rules applied equally to all, the Asia-Pacific 
now has over 100 different sets of trade rules, 
with major asymmetries in their obligations 
and standards.
The noodle bowl is widely considered to be 
bad for trade liberalisation. Markets become 
distorted by trade diversion effects, where 
economies can gain (and lose) export markets 
due to the marginal effects of FTAs rather 
than the underlying patterns of comparative 
advantage. Small economies particularly 
suffer, as they lack the clout to press for 
meaningful outcomes when negotiating with 
large economies on their own. Businesses face 
1 Here, the Asia-Pacific is defined as the 21 member economies of the APEC group.
2 This problem was initially labelled the ‘spaghetti bowl’ problem by Jagdish Bhagwati (The World Trade System At Risk, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). Richard Baldwin subsequently styled it the ‘noodle bowl’ when applying the concept to the Asia-Pacific. See Richard 
Baldwin (2007), ‘Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism’, ADB Working Paper Series (No. 7), Manila: Asian 
Development Bank. 
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increased transaction costs, as they must ensure 
compliance with literally dozens of different 
rules for each of their key export and import 
markets. These costs are especially prohibitive 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
which often lack the capacity to secure 
complex commercial advice. It also inhibits the 
development of regional production networks, 
where each link in the value chain becomes 
subject to different and cost-imposing rules 
and procedures. The inconsistencies between 
different bilateral FTAs thus become a new 
trade barrier themselves.
Cognisant of these problems, Asia-Pacific 
governments began efforts ‘multilateralise’ 
the regional trade system in the early 2000s. 
To achieve this goal, two new mega-regional 
trade agreements were proposed3. The first 
was the TPP, which was promoted by the U.S. 
government and commenced negotiations 
in March 2010. The TPP’s principal aim was to 
advance new trade law in a diverse range 
of areas – such as investment, services, 
telecommunications, finance, e-commerce 
and intellectual property. TPP membership 
was open to all APEC parties, and within a few 
years twelve states had joined the negotiations. 
The second mega-regional was RCEP, which 
was launched by ASEAN in May 2013. RCEP was 
limited to the ASEAN bloc and the six partners 
with which it had FTAs: Australia, China, India, 
Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Its reform 
objectives were more modest, focussed 
primarily on tariff reductions. 
3 For a comparative summary of the features of the TPP and RCEP, see Jeffrey D. Wilson (2016), ‘Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-
Pacific: Choosing Between the TPP and RCEP?’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 45 (2): 345-353.
Figure 1: Bilateral FTAs in-force by region of members, 2000-2015








2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 20142002 2003 2015
Others Two APEC Parties One APEC Party
PAGE 4 Indo-Pacific Insight Series, Volume 2, January 2017
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Indo-Pacific 
approach to the regional trade architecture?
As the two mega-regional proposals offered 
differing models for trade multilateralism, 
there was an inherent degree of competition 
between them. TPP negotiations were the first to 
complete in October 2015, at which time many 
concluded that the TPP had ‘won the race’ 
and would become the new regional template. 
However, these expectations were dashed in 
November 2016, when Donald Trump won the 
U.S. presidential election. Having labelled it the 
“worst deal ever” during the campaign, Trump 
has promised to withdraw the U.S. from the 
TPP on his first day in office. As the TPP requires 
that at least six members – accounting for 85 
percent of the GDP of the bloc – must ratify the 
agreement, a future U.S. withdrawal means it 
cannot take force in its present form. With the 
TPP likely to collapse, RCEP is now the only viable 
mechanism for multilateralising the regional 
trade system in the short- to medium-term. 
As a result, governments around the region 
have begun reappraising their involvement 
in ongoing RCEP negotiations. These moves 
took centre stage during the Lima APEC 
Summit of November 2016, where discussion 
was dominated by the issue of trade policy 
and RCEP’s potential role therein. The Chinese 
government – which has been the primary driver 
behind RCEP – used the Summit to pledge its 
commitment to economic openness, and push 
for a speedy completion of RCEP negotiations4.
In a frank assessment, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe recently remarked “It’s safe to 
say that we will shift focus to RCEP if TPP is 
disbanded”5.
The possibility that the U.S.-backed TPP may 
now be ‘replaced’ by the China-backed RCEP 
agreement poses important questions regarding 
how the two mega-regional agreements 
compare. How are they similar, where do they 
differ, and in what ways does RCEP offer a 
different model for trade multilateralism than 
that promised by the TPP? Three features – 
their reform ambitions, membership models 
and leadership dynamics – differentiate 
their approaches.
THE RCEP REFORM AGENDA: 
LOWER AMBITIONS, FEWER 
CONTROVERSIES?
Levels of ‘reform ambition’ – the extent to which 
an agreement seeks to enhance trade flows 
through liberalisation and policy harmonisation 
– is arguably the most salient difference. The 
TPP was described as a “21st century” trade 
agreement by its members, which promised to 
develop an ambitious set of new trade laws. 
Central to this goal were its so-called “WTO-
Plus” reforms – harmonising national policies in 
trade-related areas that act as barriers to trade, 
but are yet to be addressed at the WTO6. The 
TPP text establishes new trade law in a range of 
these areas (see Table 2), including investment, 
services trade, intellectual property and several 
other regulatory domains.
RCEP’s reform objectives are quite different. The 
negotiating parties only intend the agreement 
to be ‘WTO consistent’, rather than aiming 
for WTO-Plus reforms. Thus far, negotiating 
rounds have principally focussed on reducing 
conventional barriers to trade in goods, such as 
tariffs, quotas and customs procedures7. Far less 
is promised in terms of creating new trade law. 
Investment policy efforts only aim to promote 
cross-border capital flows (not harmonise 
national rules); and services trade provisions 
will only ‘build on’ the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
Indeed, many of the regulatory issues addressed 
in the TPP are entirely absent from RCEP, 
including intellectual property, transparency 
provisions, and environmental and labour 
standards. RCEP members are also yet to agree 
on the extent of tariff reductions8.
4 ABC News (2016), ‘APEC Summit: Xi Jinping pledges economic openness as leaders seek free trade options’, 20 November; Reuters (2016), 
APEC leaders vow to fight protectionism, look to China on trade, 21 November. 
5 Jakarta Post (2016), ‘RCEP negotiators conclude 2nd chapter’, 10 December.
6 For a discussion of WTO-Plus provisions in trade agreements, see OECD (2015), ‘Deep Provision in Regional Trade Agreements: How 
Multilateral Friendly?’, https://www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/Deep-Provisions-RTA-February-2015.pdf
7 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2016), ‘Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – News’, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/
agreements/rcep/news/Pages/news.aspx
8 Deborah Elms (2016), ‘RCEP Status Update’, Asian Trade Centre, http://www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade//rcep-status-update
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This lower level of reform ambition reflects 
RCEP’s orientation toward developing-country 
trade interests. WTO-Plus issues that are sensitive 
for developing economies – such as labour, 
intellectual property and environmental 
provisions – are not part of the negotiating 
agenda. RCEP also includes a series of provisions 
targeted at developing economies which are 
not traditionally a matter for FTAs. These include 
mechanisms for promoting economic and 
technical cooperation, alongside special and 
differential treatment for the least developed 
members. Where the TPP offered an ambitious 
but controversial reform package favoured 
by the developed economies such as Japan, 
Australia and the U.S., RCEP offers more modest 
initiatives better suited to the interests of China, 
India and developing Asia. 
Table 2: Key differences between the TPP and RCEP agreements 
TPP Official Text RCEP ‘Guiding Principles’ and subsequent negotiations, as of Dec 2016
Investment
Most-favoured-nation and national treatment 
protections, enforced via Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) process
Intent to pursue ‘promotion, protection, facilitation 
and liberalisation’ of investment. 
Transparency/ 
Anti-Corruption
Requirement for members to criminalise (and 
sanction) corruption, and to adopt appropriate 




Requirements for effective enforcement of 
national environmental law; promotion of 
collaborative activities in range of areas 
(fisheries, CITES, biodiversity, renewable energy)
None
E-commerce
Privacy protections; equal treatment of digital 
content; protections for source code




Protection of trademarks and geographical 
indicators; harmonisation of patent rules; 
life-plus-70-years standards for copyright; 
requirement for enforcement regimes
Reduce IP-related barriers to trade and investment
State-owned 
enterprises
Requirement for SOEs to act in accordance with 
‘commercial considerations’; transparency rules 
for SOEs and government monopolies
None
Telecomms
Requirement for major suppliers to provide 





National treatment, most-favoured-nation and 
cross-border-supply provisions None
Services
National treatment, most-favoured-nation and 
market access provisions Will build on existing provisions in the ASEAN+1 FTAs
Labour
Requirement to enforce labour standards; 
initiatives to discourage trade in goods made 










Special and differential treatment in agreed 
commitments, consistent with differing 
developmental levels of members
Source: Author’s summary, from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership Chapter Summaries (http://dfat.gov.au/
trade/agreements/tpp/summaries/Pages/summaries.aspx) and RCEP Parties, Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf).
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RCEP’s lower reform ambitions offer both 
benefits and costs. The absence of WTO-Plus 
reforms means it will contain fewer sensitive 
provisions, and is less likely to suffer from 
domestic-level vetoes. By imposing fewer 
adjustment costs on developing-country 
members, it is also more welcoming to a wider 
range of regional governments. However, the 
trade-creating effects of RCEP will be far lower 
than that offered by the TPP, and it circumvents 
controversy simply by excluding important and 
needed reforms in many trade related areas. In 
sum, a switch to RCEP will make regional trade 
multilateralism politically easier to achieve, 
at the cost of offering far less economically in 
terms of liberalisation and the creation of new 
trade law.
THE RCEP MEMBERSHIP MODEL: 
FROM THE ASIA-PACIFIC TO 
INDO-PACIFIC?
Membership models – the question of precisely 
who qualifies as being part of the Asian region 
– are also a marked difference. The TPP was 
squarely in the long tradition of Asia-Pacific 
economic integration advanced by APEC for 
almost three decades. All twenty-one APEC 
member economies were invited to join the 
TPP negotiations, whose final text endorsed 
the principle of ‘open regionalism’9 through 
the inclusion of an accession mechanism. 
Four countries – Canada, Malaysia, Mexico 
and Japan – took advantage of this open 
approach to join during the negotiation process. 
Expectations were that the treaty would 
continue to grow following ratification, and 
since 2013 Korea has been actively exploring 
accession pathways with other TPP members10.
RCEP’s membership model breaks with these 
traditions. The agreement is centred on the 
ASEAN bloc rather than APEC, and formally 
endorses the principle of ‘ASEAN Centrality’11 
in Asian regionalism. Negotiations only involve 
the six governments which currently have ‘Plus 
One’ FTA with the ASEAN bloc. This means that 
RCEP has better membership coverage of Asia, 
by including China, India, Korea, Indonesia and 
the less-developed members of ASEAN. But by 
corollary, it excludes the Pacific economies who 
are major trade and investment partners of the 
region, particularly Canada, the United States 
and Mexico. In this way, RCEP instead offers 
an Indo-Pacific conception of who constitutes 
the region.
It also remains unclear to what extent RCEP 
will continue the practice of open regionalism. 
During the negotiation phase, the agreement 
is only open to ASEAN and its six current FTA 
partners. No countries have therefore been able 
to join. According to the RCEP parties’ ‘Guiding 
Principles’ statement of 2013, the final text will 
include an open accession clause which will 
“allow the participation… of any other external 
economic partners after the completion of 
the RCEP negotiations”. However, precisely 
how this accession clause will be designed 
remains an open question, as does the issue of 
which external partners will be encouraged (or 
potentially discouraged) to seek membership. 
Unlike the TPP – which explicitly targeted 
all APEC members – there is considerable 
uncertainty over whether, and indeed how, 
RCEP’s membership may subsequently expand.
RCEP therefore marks an historic shift in the 
architecture of Asian economic regionalism: 
from an open Asia-Pacific model to a more 
closed Indo-Pacific variant. This is potentially 
more attractive to some countries in the region 
who have adopted Indo-Pacific-type foreign 
policy strategies, particularly India and some 
ASEAN states. RCEP also includes China, for 
whom future membership of the TPP was 
an unlikely proposition in the medium-term. 
Unfortunately, it does so by excluding the Pacific 
wing of the region, most notably the U.S.. The 
RCEP model therefore trades the U.S. for India 
and China.
Whether this trade-off is beneficial is a matter 
for debate. It is certainly true that China is the 
number one trade partner for many economies 
9 Ann Capling and John Ravenhill (2011), ‘Multilateralising regionalism: What role for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement?’, The Pacific 
Review, 24(5): 553-575.
10 Mireya Solis (2013), ‘South Korea’s Fateful Decision on the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, Foreign Policy at Brookings Policy Papers (No. 31), The 
Brookings Institution.
11 This is the principle that ASEAN should be at the centre of all major regionalism initiatives in Asia. The ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN 
Plus 3 Summits are leading examples. See Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer (2014), ‘ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN-US Economic 
Relationship’, East-West Centre Policy Studies (No. 69).
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in the region (see Table 3), and its absence 
from the TPP detracted from the impact of 
the agreement. However, the U.S. remains an 
important trade partner as well, particularly in 
terms of services exports to its large consumer 
and corporate markets. Moreover, the U.S. 
remains the top source of inward foreign direct 
investment for regional economies; a role 
that China – despite its increasing investment 
presence abroad – is nowhere near matching. 
Swapping the U.S. for China does not make 
RCEP’s Indo-Pacific membership model an 
intrinsically better approach than the Asia-




































































































Figure 2: U.S. and China as economic partners to major Asia-Pacific economies (USD billions)
Source: Author’s calculations, from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral FDI Statistics Database (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/
DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx) and UNCTADStat Database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/).
FDI STOCKS 2012 EXPORTS 2015
TOTAL TOTAL
(U.S.) 392.2 52.8 (China) (U.S.) 362.9 450.5 (China)
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RCEP AND GEOPOLITICS: LESS 
BAGGAGE, LESS LEADERSHIP?
One of the largest controversies surrounding 
the TPP was its links to the geopolitical rivalry 
between the China and the U.S.. The Obama 
Administration labelled the TPP the “economic 
wing” of its so-called Pivot to Asia policy12; 
and several commentators alleged it was 
a deliberate U.S. attempt to ‘economically 
encircle’ China in the region13. President Obama 
played to geopolitical considerations when 
selling the TPP to domestic audiences, arguing 
“The TPP allows America – and not countries 
like China – to write the rules of the road in the 
21st century, which is especially important in a 
region as dynamic as the Asia-Pacific”14. For 
many governments, joining the TPP was as much 
about signalling allegiances between the two 
major powers in the region as achieving trade 
policy goals.
Somewhat fortunately, RCEP no longer suffers 
from problems of geopolitical baggage. 
With the TPP now seemingly dead, RCEP will 
no longer be viewed as the lower-quality 
‘Chinese alternative’. Rather, it is now the 
only practicable vehicle for multilateralising 
the regional trade architecture. The Chinese 
government immediately seized on the 
opportunity of U.S. withdrawal from the TPP to 
make a renewed push for the RCEP agreement. 
At the 2016 APEC Summit, Xi Jinping called on 
member economies to complete RCEP, in order 
to realise the long-standing goal of creating the 
‘Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific’ (FTAAP)15. 
While the APEC Leaders’ Lima Declaration 
officially recognised both the TPP and RCEP 
as potential pathways for realising FTAAP16, 
most observers recognise RCEP is now the only 
viable mechanism moving forward. With rivalry 
between TPP and RCEP out of the way, the 
geopolitical headwinds for multilateralising 
the regional trade architecture have been 
substantially lowered.
Unfortunately, this has come at the cost of 
clear leadership. While the TPP was always 
acknowledged a U.S.-led initiative, RCEP suffers 
from having multiple parents. It is ostensibly 
an ASEAN-led initiative, which formally 
affirms ASEAN Centrality and makes the bloc 
the nucleus around which regional trade 
agreements will be constructed. But in reality, 
its leading advocate and primary driver has 
been China. Several major RCEP members – 
including Japan and Australia – have clearly 
demonstrated a preference for the TPP, leaving 
China to push RCEP negotiations forward 
largely on its own. The enthusiastic participation 
of Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam in TPP 
negotiations is also indicative of an intra-ASEAN 
split on the relative merits of the two mega-
regional deals. 
Whether China has the diplomatic heft to push 
RCEP to completion remains an open question. 
Negotiations were initially planned to be 
completed by the end of 2015; yet after sixteen 
rounds of negotiation the agreement remains 
far from complete. The Indian government 
has proven one of the holdouts – insisting on a 
three-tiered structure for tariff reductions that 
benefited itself and ASEAN at the expense of 
other parties, particularly China17. Though this 
proposal has now been shelved, considerable 
progress is still required on market access 
provisions, and most regulatory chapters remain 
to be drafted. Despite its comparatively modest 
reform ambitions, China negotiators have 
struggled to gain traction during negotiations 
thus far. As RCEP is the first multilateral trade 
agreement which China has led, this may 
be indicative of a learning curve facing its 
trade negotiators.
12 Mark E. Manyin et al. (2012), ‘Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia’, Congressional Research 
Service Reports (No. R42448). 
13 Sanchita Basu Das (2013), The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a tool to contain China: myth or reality?’, East Asia Forum, 8 June; The Economist 
(2015), ‘Don’t treat trade as a weapon’, 25 April.
14 The White House (2016), ‘Statement by the President on the Signing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership’, 3 February.
15 Bloomberg (2016), ‘China Set to Push Asia Trade Deal Harder After Trump Win’, 15 November; China Daily (2016), ‘China ushers in new FTAAP 
era’, 22 November.
16 APEC Leaders (2016), The Lima Declaration on FTAAP, http://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Leaders-Declarations/2016/2016_aelm/2016_
Annex%20A.aspx 
17 Amitendu Palit (2016), ‘India inches towards liberalisation at RCEP’, East Asia Forum, 30 September.
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THE FUTURE OF RCEP: 
NEGOTIATIONS TO GATHER PACE 
IN 2017
At the time of writing, RCEP negotiations remain 
ongoing. The chapters on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation and Small- and Medium-
Enterprises are complete; while all parties have 
now submitted initial offers for trade in goods, 
trade in services and investment reservation lists. 
However, much remains to be settled. Market 
access negotiations for tariff reductions still need 
to strike a compromise between developed- 
and developing-country commitments; and 
the text of all other chapters remains in the 
drafting stage. 
Moreover, some questions remain regarding 
the scope of the agreement itself, with 
ongoing discussions over whether to extend 
the negotiations to include government 
procurement and the movement of natural 
persons. Negotiating parties also have widely 
divergent views on whether to include a (highly 
controversial) Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
mechanism. The design of the accession clause 
will also be a critical issue, as this will determine 
the extent to which RCEP will be open to new 
members joining the agreement.
With the bulk of the text still up for negotiation, 
it is difficult to predict the exact content of 
the final agreement. However, we should 
expect progress to accelerate in 2017 for the 
following reasons:
1. With the TPP now moribund, RCEP is the 
only mega-regional FTA that remains a 
going concern. Aspirations to multilateralise 
the regional trade architecture have no 
alternate outlet but RCEP in the short- to 
medium-term.
2. China flagged its commitment to leadership 
in regional trade talks only days after Trump’s 
victory in the U.S. election. It is now actively 
positioning RCEP as the ‘pathway’ for APEC 
members to achieve FTAAP. We should 
expect intensified efforts from Chinese 
negotiators in future RCEP rounds.
3. Many of the developed-economy 
governments in the region – especially 
Japan and Australia – had previously 
prioritised the TPP, leaving China to push 
RCEP on its own. Once the TPP formally 
collapses, it is likely these governments will 
take a greater interest in RCEP negotiations.
4. India has now shelved its problematic 
request for a three-tiered tariff schedule; 
in exchange for commitments that tariff, 
services and investment commitments would 
be made as a ‘single undertaking’18. This 
clears the primary obstacle which afflicted 
RCEP negotiations during 2016.
5. Developing economies in Southeast Asia 
are far more comfortable with the lower 
ambition approach of RCEP. As China 
and others redouble their negotiating 
efforts, these governments are likely to 
respond positively.
RCEP is clearly the future of the Asia-
Pacific trade system. Like the TPP, it seeks to 
multilateralise the region’s fractured bilateral 
architecture. But it offers a dramatically different 
model for doing so. RCEP is far less ambitious 
on trade policy reform, but is likely to avoid 
many of the controversies that plagued the 
high-standard TPP. It offers a closed Indo-Pacific 
rather than open Asia-Pacific conception of 
the region, in which China is the lynchpin for 
economic integration. The absence of the U.S. 
means RCEP is less bound up in geopolitical 
rivalries between the region’s major powers, 
but it remains unclear who will provide the 
leadership needed to drive the process forward. 
As negotiations gather pace in 2017, the final 
shape of the new regional trade architecture 
will begin to come into view.
18 Bridges Trade News (2016), ‘As TPP Ratification Faces Uphill Battle in Washington, Questions Build for RCEP Timing’, 7 September; Economic 
Times (2016), ‘RCEP countries agree to Indian demand on services, investment negotiations’, 8 November.
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